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In August 1997, eight states from the Northeast filed petitions with the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).' The petitions cited
the interstate movement of various chemicals from the Midwest and South
as contributing factors to persistent ground-level ozone problems in these
states. 2 The states sought an EPA ruling recognizing Midwest pollution as a
significant factor in their ozone noncompliance. 3 Further, if the EPA made
such a ruling, the Northeast states desired EPA promulgation of regulations
imposing strict emission limits on Midwest power plants, industrial sources,
and other large emitters of ozone-related chemicals. 4
I The eight states filing petitions and the dates the EPA received these petitions are
as follows: Connecticut (August 15, 1997), Maine (August 15, 1997), Massachusetts
(August 14, 1997), New Hampshire (August 15, 1997), New York (August 15, 1997),
Pennsylvania (August 15, 1997), Rhode Island (August 14, 1997), Vermont (August 15,
1997). See Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on
Section 126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,769, 54,769-54,770 (1997) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 52). See generally Jim Nichols, Pennsylvania Files Pollution Complaint,
PLAiN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 15, 1997, at l-B; Northeast v. Midwest at EPA, CmI.
SuN-TvmEs, Aug. 15, 1997, at 4; Northeast States Join Move Aimed at Midwest Smog,
CIN. PosT, Aug. 9, 1997, at 7A.
2 Specifically, the petitions requested that the EPA determine that major sources of
NO, in Eastern and Southern states, ranging from Minnesota to Louisiana to Georgia,
significantly contribute to ozone nonattainment status in the Northeast. See Final
Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on Section 126 Petitions,
62 Fed. Reg. at 54,770; see also Northeast v. Midwest at EPA, supra note 1, at 4. The
petitions were filed pursuant to section 126 of the Clean Air Act. See Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 § 126, 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (1994).
3 See Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on
Section 126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 54,770.
4 See Nichols, supra note 1, at 1-B. If the EPA were to determine that the sources
identified in the section 126 petitions did significantly contribute to Northeast ozone
nonattainment, then those sources would be required to shut down in three months or
adopt emission compliance schedules required by the EPA "as expeditiously as
practicable, but in no case later than three years after" the EPA makes its
determination. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c); see also Final Determination to Extend Deadline
for Promulgation of Action on Section 126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 54,770.
In fact, the EPA has proposed to find that some of the sources in the section 126
petitions significantly contribute to the ozone noncompliance in Northeastern petitioning
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Unfortunately, this action frustrated two years of research,
states. See Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemakings on Section 126
Petitions and Federal Implementation Plans for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,213, 52,213 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 97,
98) (proposed Sept. 30, 1998) ("[The] EPA is proposing to find that portions of certain
petitions are technically meritorious under the test applicable under section 126."); see
also Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for
Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,058, 24,058 (1998)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). In addition, the EPA announced its intention to
issue final rules by April 30, 1999 that establish slecific baseline emission standards for
pollutants at the targeted stationary sources. See Correction and Clarification to the
Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,220, 71,221 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51, 96) (providing that "the budgets for the section 126 final rulemaking... must
be finalized by April 30, 1999").
However, the EPA may wait to issue the final rule establishing that specific sources
in upwind states significantly contribute to the ozone nonattainment problems in
downwind, petitioning states. See Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking
on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed.
Reg. 56,292, 56,294-56,295 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 97) (proposed
Oct. 21, 1998). The EPA intends to withhold a decision on whether the petitions are
"granted or denied ... pending certain actions by States and [the] EPA regarding
implementation plans required in response to" a recently adopted call for revised State
Implementation Plans (SIPs). Id. at 56,295. This call for revised SIPs is an attempt by
the EPA to adopt the Ozone Transport Assessment Group's recommendations for
control of interstate ozone migration. See Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,356
(1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96).
[The final rule is] to require 22 States and the District of Columbia to submit State
[I]mplementation [P]lan... revisions to prohibit specified amounts of emissions
of oxides of nitrogen (NOx)-one of the precursors to ozone (smog) pollution-for
the purpose of reducing NOx and ozone transport across State boundaries in the
eastern half of the United States.
Id.; see also infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (describing the Ozone Transport
Assessment Group and its efforts to research, understand, and remedy the interstate
ozone transport problem). However, it appears that the EPA may be deviating from its
schedule for SIP revisions due to technical difficulties in obtaining complete comments
from all concerned and affected parties. See Reopening of Emissions Inventory
Comment Periods for the Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemakings on
Section 126 Petitions and Federal Implementation Plans for Purposes of Reducing
Interstate Transport of Ozone, 64 Fed. Reg. 2416, 2416 (1999) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 52, 97, 98) (reopening the comment period on certain emission inventory
databases due to difficulties States had in accessing these databases). It is unclear how
this delay may affect the EPA's issuance of final rules for the section 126 petitions.
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investigation, and negotiation between the thirty-seven easternmost states
regarding persistent ozone pollution problems.5 This Note will attempt to
explain the following: (1) the interstate ozone pollution problem in the
United States, (2) the stakes and positions of Northeastern and Midwestern
interests, and (3) the results of two years of negotiations and the likely
ramifications of proposed EPA regulations. Finally, recommendations will
be made for dealing with future interstate pollution problems and potential
negotiations between states regarding those problems.
I. INTERSTATE OZONE POLLUTION
A. What Is Interstate Ozone Pollution and Why Is It a Problem?
The long-range, interstate movement of pollutants through media such
as water and air is known as transboundary pollution. 6 Numerous interstate
pollutants exist, and many national and international efforts have been
made to deal with sources and problems associated with them.7 Interstate
pollutants pose special problems for regulators because they involve
multiple jurisdictions. Successfully addressing and mitigating the effects of
interstate pollutants requires negotiating coordinated efforts between
5 See Nichols, supra note 1, at 1-B. The thirty-seven easternmost states and the
District of Columbia had been engaged in a collaborative process seeking to understand
the interstate ozone problem and to make regulatory recommendations to the EPA
regarding this problem. The states formed the Ozone Transport Assessment Group
(OTAG) in carrying out this process. See Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,323
(1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed Nov. 7, 1997). The thirty-seven
states involved are identified infra note 80.
6 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DuKE
L.J. 931, 932 (1997) (noting that pollution can cross political boundaries and is thus a
"transboundary phenomenon"). In this Note, the Author has chosen to use the term
"interstate pollution" as a substitute for "transboundary pollution," as the political
boundaries involved in ozone transport are those between the states.
7 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv.
570, 601-602 (1996) (noting that transboundary pollution effects were one of the driving
forces behind enactment of many of the environmental laws in the United States). But
see Merrill,'supra note 6, at 933-934 (arguing that the development of transboundary
pollution controls in the United States has been hindered by wavering Supreme Court
decisions and a failure of the major environmental statutes to adequately address
pollution migration).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
pollution-generating states ("upwind states") and pollution-recipient states
("downwind states"). 8
1. Scientific Factors
Ozone has long been recognized as one of the EPA's criteria
pollutants. 9 Ozone causes a variety of human health problems as well as
deleterious agricultural and forest impacts.' 0 In fact, recent research
indicates human health effects may be particularly severe.11 Efforts to
8 See Merrill, supra note 6, at 932 (explaining the conflicting interests of the
source and recipient states and suggesting the need for centralized control in interstate
pollution).
9 See Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone
Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
Criteria pollutants are those for which the EPA establishes permissible levels of
exposure and those that the EPA requires State Implementation Plans to control. See
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1994).
10 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,359 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51, 72, 75, 96) (noting the adverse health effects of ozone and that ozone "is also
responsible for significant agricultural crop yield losses" as well as causing "noticeable
foliar damage in many crops [and] trees"); WOLFGANG SACHS ET AL., GREENING THE
NORTH: A POST-INDUSTRIAL BLUEPRINT FOR ECOLOGY AND EQUITY 34 (1998) (noting
that "high ozone concentrations... directly harm[] plants, animals, and human beings"
and may be "responsible for 90% of the harm done to plants by airborne pollutants");
David C. Christiani, Urban and Transboundary Air Pollution: Human Health
Consequences, in CRITICAL CONDITION: HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
REPORT BY PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 13, 15 (Eric Chivian et al. eds.,
1993) (noting that ozone causes a variety of changes in respiratory mechanics, including
nasal inflammation, bronchoconstriction, and, at extremely high levels, pulmonary
edema); David T. Tingey et al., Effects of Ozone on Crops, in TROPOSPHERIC OZONE:
HUMAN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS 175, 176-180 (David J. McKee ed.,
1994) (identifying some of the effects on agricultural crop plants including leaf necrosis,
yield reductions, and fruit quality reductions); see also COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY TOGETHER WITH THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS 9
(Dale Curtis & Barry Walden Walsh eds., 1993).
11 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,356. The EPA notes that:
Ground-level ozone has long been recognized, in both clinical and
epidemiological research, to affect public health. There is a wide range of ozone-
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control and mitigate ozone have focused on the pollutant's primary
precursors.12 Because ozone, unlike other criteria pollutants, is not readily
emitted from identifiable sources, it has proven difficult to regulate
effectively.' 3
Ozone is one of a class of pollutants known as photochemical
oxidants.1 4 These gases form in the atmosphere as a result of reactions
between precursor chemicals and a sunlight catalyst.' 5 The ozone
induced health effects, including decreased lung function (primarily in children
active outdoors), increased respiratory symptoms (particularly in highly sensitive
individuals), increased hospital admissions and emergency room visits for
respiratory causes (among children and adults with pre-existing respiratory disease
such as asthma), increased inflammation of the lung, and possible long-term
damage to the lungs.
Id. In addition, ozone exposure limits an individual's maximum athletic performance
level, decreases lung function, and increases lung permeability. See David V. Bates,
The Effects of Photochemical Air Pollution on People, in TRoPosPHERic OzoNE:
HUMAN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS, supra note 10, at 225, 226-227 (noting
that recent research indicates that the human effects of ozone exposure include
reductions in the maximum respiration an individual is capable of; further noting that it
is not airway constriction but most likely a spinal reflex due to ozone exposure that
causes this reduction in respiration capacity).
12 See G.T. Helms et al., The Clean Air Act Amendments-The USEPA's Role in
Abating Ozone Air Pollution, in TRoPosPHERIc OzoNE: HUMAN HEALTH AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS, supra note 10, at 209, 209-210. The EPA's efforts to control
ground-level ozone and interstate transport of ozone have identified and focused on the
precursors to ozone. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for
Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes -of
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,359.
13 Effective regulation of ozone relies on control of ozone precursors. The most
significant of these precursors, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), are primarily
emitted by transportation sources such as automobiles, aircraft, and railroads. Because
these sources are highly mobile and occur in large numbers, it is difficult to identify
which sources are the worst emitters. See Helms et al., supra note 12, at 210-211.
Other pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide, are emitted from a discrete number of clearly
identifiable, stationary sources. These pollutants have proven easier to regulate because
pollution control measures can be adopted at the source, can be readily modeled to
predict future costs, and can be compared to existing inventories of known emission
levels absent pollution control. See Paul R. Portney, Economics and the Clean Air Act,
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1990, at 173, 174-175.
14 See Christiani, supra note 10, at 20.
15 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,359 ("Ground-level ozone... is produced in
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photochemical reaction is largely driven by the presence of nitrogen oxides
(NOx), oxygen (02), and hydrocarbons (specifically, volatile organic
compounds (VOCs)). 16 While studies have attributed the atmospheric
presence of these chemicals to various sources, they are largely the
byproduct of fossil fuel combustion. 17 Consequently, ozone tends to form
in areas with high concentrations of fossil fuel use. In most of the United
States, these are the large urban and metropolitan centers.18
In addition to locally produced NOx and VOCs, ozone precursors have
been shown by recent studies to have the ability to migrate.19 According to
these studies, downwind localities would face an ozone problem caused by
their own locally generated chemical precursors, as well as those
"imported" from an upwind region. 20 This phenomenon accounts for the
interstate ozone pollution problem.
Studies modelling the migration of ozone precursors in the United
States tend to indicate that what movement there is occurs in conjunction
with prevailing winds. 21 These winds tend to move from west to east in
complex chemical reactions when its precursors, volatile organic compounds... and
NOx, react in the presence of sunlight.").
16 Specifically, a series of reactions between these precursor chemicals occurs.
These reactions are the following:
1. NO2 + (near-ultraviolet solar radiation) -4 NO + 0 (photodissociation of NO2)
2. 0 + 02 + (molecule which removes excess energy) -4 03 + (molecule)
3. NO + 03 "- NO 2 + 02 (rapid atmospheric reaction removing ozone)
When chemical reaction 3 is inhibited by the presence of chemicals such as VOCs
which can convert NO to NO2 without destroying ozone (03), ozone levels accumulate
in the atmosphere. See David J. McKee, Introduction to TROPOsPHERIC OzoNE: HUMAN
HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS, supra note 10, at 3, 3-4.
17 See id. at 5.
18 See id. In addition, the EPA notes that areas with concentrations of ozone high
enough to result in noncompliance with national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
include "many of the major urban centers in the eastern half of the Nation." Finding of
Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport
Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63
Fed. Reg. at 57,359. The EPA estimates that the total population living in areas that
violate the 1-hour or 8-hour NAAQS includes approximately 73 million people living in
23 different states. See id.
19 Ozone Transport Assessment Group, Technical Support Document, Final Report
(visited Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/ttnotagl/finalrpt/chpl/chapl.htm>.
20 See id.
21 See OTAG Recommends Ozone Controls Tailored to Pollution Transport, 31
ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 352A, 352A (1997).
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North America, and some migration from the Midwest industrial centers
toward the Northeast has been documented.22
2. Economic Factors
The cost of controlling ozone pollution has proven considerable in the
past several decades. Efforts to reduce NOx and VOCs in the atmosphere
have focused on both stationary sources and mobile sources. 23 Northeastern
states, which face persistent ozone pollution problems, have negotiated a
compact that reduces NOx emissions from major stationary sources. The
compact allots each Northeastern state an extremely limited quantity of
permissible NOx emissions and provides for gradual reductions in that
quantity over time. 24 In addition, for mobile sources, the EPA requires that
most states in the Northeast conduct rigorous automobile emission
monitoring and offer reformulated gasolines for sale during certain months
of the year.25
However, many of the states in the Midwest and South have not faced
as elaborate an ozone control program. These states have not been required
to institute the stricter NOx stationary source emission limits. 26 Nor have
22 See id.
23 See Helms et al., supra note 12, at 210-211. Stationary sources are those fixed
at a single point, such as factories and electric generating power plants. The Clean Air
Act defines stationary source as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § ll1(a)(3),
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (1994). Mobile sources are those that move about and cannot be
fixed to a single point, such as automobiles, airplanes, and more generally,
transportation sources. See Helms et al., supra note 12, at 211.
24 See George Lobsenz, New York lOUs, IPPs Settle NO, Allocation Spat, ENERGY
DAILY, Jan. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8791767. The severity of the reductions is
extreme. New York alone must reduce its NO, emissions 44% by 1999 and 62% by
2003. See id.
25 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 46 & n.257, 47 (noting the political unpopularity of
automobile emissions testing and reformulated gasolines) (citing Scott Allen, Maine
Drivers Shun Emissions Testing: Voluntary Inspections Run Up Against Hostility,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1995, at 29).
26 Most areas in the Midwest and South comply with the EPA's pollutant standards
and are thus in "attainment." See Helms et al., supra note 12, at 213 fig.1. When an
area is in attainment, the EPA cannot require that the state's SIP adopt stricter emission
control measures than are already in place. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1994) (providing that the SIP "will specify the manner
in which... ambient air quality standards will be... maintained within each air
quality control region in [the] State").
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many adopted widespread automobile emission monitoring or reformulated
gasoline programs; only in the worst ozone pollution areas have these
mobile source controls been required. 27
Efforts to control interstate ozone precursor migration have been
largely thwarted because of economic externalities. 28 When pollution
precursors migrate out of an upwind region, that upwind region does not
suffer local pollution problems attributable to these "exported" pollution
precursors. 29 Without experiencing the full impact of ozone pollution
caused by the region's entire complement of generated ozone precursors,
the region does not act at a socially optimal level to reduce the production
of ozone precursors. 30 Instead, those precursors migrate downwind and
impose a social cost on the downwind region in the form of increased
ozone pollution. It is this imposed social cost-not accounted for in the
producing region's production decisions-that represents the externality. 31
Efforts to eliminate ozone precursors generated by the downwind region
cannot completely eliminate the downwind region's ozone problem because
imported precursors are not controlled and continue to migrate into the
downwind region. Only control of the imported precursors at their source-
the upwind region-can mitigate the downwind region's ozone pollution
problem.
Due to this externality, efforts to control an interstate ozone pollution
problem could take one of three forms. First, the externality could be
internalized by forcing the upwind region to realize (or suffer, through a
tax) the social costs imposed on the downwind region. The upwind region
would then account for these costs in setting the socially optimal level of
27 See Nichols, supra note 1, at 1-B. Some of the Midwestern and Southern
metropolitan areas that have achieved at least a "severe" nonattainment classification
under the Clean Air Act include Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Milwaukee, and New
Orleans. Some of the cities with at least a "moderate" nonattainment classification
include Cleveland, Cincinnati, Dallas, Detroit, Miami, Nashville, and St. Louis. See
Helms et al., supra note 12, at 213 fig.1.
28 See Merrill, supra note 6, at 968 (noting that transboundary pollution causes a
physical externality or spillover effect between jurisdictions); see also Emilson C.D.
Silva, Decentralized and Efficient Control of Transboundary Pollution in Federal
Systems, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 95, 95-96 (1997) (discussing the externalities
in all transboundary pollution situations).
29 See Silva, supra note 28, at 96.
30 Cf id. at 96-97 (discussing interstate water pollution, rather than interstate air
pollution).
31 Cf. id. at 96.
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ozone precursor generation. 32 Production of these chemicals would drop to
a level significant enough to cure not only local ozone pollution problems,
but those caused downwind by migrating chemicals.
Second, the upwind region could make an income transfer to the
downwind region equal to the social cost imposed by the migrating ozone
precursors. 33 This effort would internalize the externality by transferring
income sufficient to compensate the downwind residents for the harm
imposed by upwind ozone precursor generation. 34 Downwind residents
could then use this income to further abate locally generated precursors or
pay for the health and environmental damages associated with ozone
pollution.
Finally, the externality could be internalized by imposing an emissions
cap on the upwind region. 35 This emissions cap for the upwind region
would be set at the socially optimal level of ozone precursor generation.
The cost incurred by the upwind region in complying with the emissions
cap shifts the burden of curing downwind ozone pollution problems to the
upwind region. Further, by limiting the total quantity of ozone precursors
produced by the upwind region to a sufficient level, regulators could cure
local ozone pollution problems in the upwind region as well as ozone levels
caused downwind by the migrating precursors.
3. Political Factors
One of the significant impediments to achieving consensus in
addressing interstate ozone problems is the role of politics.36 Regional
32 Cf id.
33 Cf. id.
34 C. id.
35 This appears to be the approach favored by the EPA in addressing the interstate
movement of ozone precursors. The EPA is establishing stricter limits on ozone
precursor generation for the Midwest and South, even though large parts of these areas
are in compliance with ozone standards. See Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,359
(1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96). The goal of such stricter limits
is to "reduce transported NO, and ozone." Id.
36 See Merrill, supra note 6, at 934-935 (noting that of the structural features
common to interstate pollution disputes, "the sharply conflicting nature of the interests
of the disputing parties" are "[o]f particular significance" and that a state may have "no
incentive to participate in a regime of centralized regulation").
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representatives must remain true to the interests of their constituents.
However, the interests of constituents in the upwind and downwind regions
do not coincide. 37
Assuming that each region's economy is relatively insulated, the costs
of addressing ozone precursor reductions must be incurred by the region
making the reduction. This assumption is borne out in the United States
where most NOx and VOC production occurs as a result of fossil fuel
power plants and automobile operation. 38  Because electric power
generation is still largely regional39 and local operators bear automobile
operating costs, any efforts to reduce ozone precursor emissions will likely
result in increased power rates and increased automobile operating costs in
the region making a reduction. 4°
Making the further assumption that the costs and effects of ozone
pollution are imposed on the region where that ozone occurs, a political
37 See id. at 976-979 (concluding that in the interstate pollution context, the
interests of individual states are in conflict).
38 See McKee, supra note 16, at 5; Terry F. Yosie et al., Ozone Policy from a
Petroleum Industry Perspective: Lessons Learned, Future Directions, in TROPOSPHERIC
OZONE: HUMAN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS, supra note 10, at 301, 314.
39 See David E. Wojick, Regional Power Markets: Roadblock to Choice?, PUB.
UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Oct. 1, 1997, at 28, 29 (noting that the ability of adjoining electric
power generation regions to transmit electricity is typically less than five percent of the
region's generating capacity and that the regional structure of the electric power
industry "tends to isolate ... suppliers from their potential low-cost competitors"); see
also David Haarneyer et al., The New England Auction: Regional Strategy for
Competitive Generation, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 1998, at 34, 35 (noting
that the New England power market is "a regional power market" and "tends to be
isolated and high-priced"). However, with the advent of power industry deregulation, it
is very likely that the electric power generation market will become more national, and
less regional, in the near future. See Alexander Cavalli & Jane K. Winn, Internet
Security in the Electric Utility Industry, 38 JURIMERIucs J. 459, 461-462 (1998)
(describing a gradual progression, starting in the 1970s, of the electric power industry
from regional power markets to a national electric power market and noting that despite
congressional enactments in 1992 meant to facilitate this progression "markets for the
generation, long-distance transmission, and local distribution of electric power are not
yet fully competitive"). This Author does not attempt to explain how deregulation will
impact the physical or legal issues of interstate ozone transport.
40 See Yosie et al., supra note 38, at 315-317, 316 tbl.2 (noting that states where
reductions are sought may have to adopt "Maximum Achievable Control Technology"
requirements for fuel combustion facilities, the use of low NO, burners for boilers and
diesel engines, advanced vehicle emissions tests, and gasoline vapor recovery systems
for automobiles). Measures such as these will increase the costs of day-to-day industrial
and automobile operation.
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stalemate results between upwind and downwind regions. Upwind
representatives present the interests of constituents facing increased costs of
power and transportation without a corresponding health or environmental
benefit. Downwind representatives call for controls that their constituents
will benefit from but will not pay for.
This theoretical scenario is not without precedent. In August 1997,
when states from the Northeast filed their petitions, Midwestern interests
characterized the effort as an attempt to "foist off [the Northeast's ozone]
problem on someone else." 41 Similarly, one Northeastern attorney general
said of Midwest states that "[lit 'is only right that these sources of our air
pollution ... do their share to clean up the air." 42
4. Legal Factors
Interstate effects of pollution have been identified as one of the
compelling reasons for federal intervention in the environmental arena.43 In
fact, many of our nation's most important environmental statutes were
passed in direct response to the perceived inability of states to deal with
interstate pollution. 44 However, efforts to deal with interstate pollutants
have largely occurred on a piecemeal basis. 45
41 Northeast States Join Move Aimed at Midwest Smog, supra note 1, at 7A.
42 Electric Shorts, FosTER ELEcTRI c REP., Aug. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10339846 (quoting William Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont).
43 See Esty, supra note 7, at 601-602 (noting that one of the three broad reasons
for federal centralization of environmental regulation was the "spill overs of
pollution"); Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance
Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 457 (1997) (noting that
"federal efforts at statutory pollution control grew out of a desire to control interstate
pollution"); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New)
Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 97, 167 (1996)
(asserting that if "the impetus to regulate is thwarted by the state's opportunity to export
pollution, then the rationale for federal intervention is compelling").
44 See Esty, supra note 7, at 600-602 (arguing that early "federal efforts to support
and prod state-level environmental regulation produced unsatisfactory results" and
further arguing that because of these state failings, Congress acted to pass the Clean Air
Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972 which "shifted the center of gravity for
environmental regulation from the states to the federal government").
45 See Merrill, supra note 6, at 932. One commentator notes that while
"widespread invocation of transboundary pollution as a justification for [the] trend"
toward "centralized regulatory authority" occurs, "little meaningful regulation of
transboundary pollution actually exists." Id. at 932-933. In fact, this commentator
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Until the most recent amendments to the Clean Air Act,46 no effective
legal framework existed within which downwind states could request
federal intervention forcing upwind states to control ozone precursor
chemical emissions.47 Some commentators have proposed that interstate
pollutants might be adequately addressed through state nuisance law, but
the difficulty of proving causation and harm might account for the relative
lack of cases brought to stop ozone transport on this front. 48 Historically,
the only means of preventing the migration of ozone precursors was to
either request that upwind states address the problem or lobby for
congressional action to address the problem.
B. Environmental Legislation Dealing with Interstate Ozone
Pollution
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) 49 provided Congress's
clearest message yet regarding the role of the EPA in addressing interstate
pollution problems. Although Congress did not provide explicit directives
for the EPA, the 1990 CAAA strengthened the EPA's scope of review for
State Implementation Plans. 50 This gives the EPA a stronger hand in
characterizes the federal environmental statutes as having "largely failed to regulate
transboundary pollution." Id.
46 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
47 The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments did provide a mechanism for aggrieved
states to petition the EPA if they felt an upwind state was significantly contributing to
downwind nonattainment. See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 22-23. However, no state ever
successfully petitioned the EPA for such a finding. See id. at 24. Further, the
mechanism "applied only to 'major stationary sources of emissions.'" Id. at 23 (quoting
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)). A
"major source" under the 1977 Amendments only included facilities that emitted at least
100 tons of a pollutant per year. Id. at 23 n.127 (citing the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977, 91 Stat. at 685).
48 See generally Heimert, supra note 43.
49 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671.
50 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 31-32. The two major changes in the 1990 CAAA
that expand the EPA's scope of review are first, a change in language that allows the
EPA to reject a SIP if it does not adequately address the interstate transport of pollutants
coming from any "source or other type of emissions activity" within the state. 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). The former language only included pollutants coming from
any "sources." This means that the EPA can consider a group of sources or a group of
mobile sources when determining that a SIP does not address interstate transport
adequately. See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 31. Second, the EPA is granted permission to
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requiring upwind states to reduce generation of ozone precursors. An
examination of past legislation addressing interstate pollution problems is
useful in this context.51
1. The 1970 Act
In 1970, Congress passed the first Clean Air Act (CAA). 52 Seen largely
as a federal response to state inaction under earlier legislation, the 1970
CAA required that a state "take the necessary measures to 'insure' against
the effects" of interstate air pollution. 53 The EPA interpreted this
congressional directive as more persuasive than mandatory. 54
Consequently, states were required only to exchange information regarding
interstate pollution problems. Little effort was made to reduce the
generation or migration of interstate pollutants. 55
consider interstate transport that will "contribute significantly" to a downwind state's
nonattainment. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). Formerly, the EPA could only consider
interstate transport that would "prevent nonattainment." This change in language relaxes
the standard and makes it easier for the EPA to reject a SIP for inadequate interstate
transport provisions. See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 31-32.
51 This examination draws much of its form and some of its substance from
Wilcox, supra note 9. Any misstatement of information gleaned from Wilcox's article is
solely this Author's error and should not be attributed to Wilcox.
52 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Technically, this law is not
the first Clean Air Act. Congress had made a number of earlier attempts in the 1950s
and 1960s to deal with the growing air pollution problem through legislation dubbed
"Clean Air Act." However, most commentators refer to the 1970 Act as the first
comprehensive federal environmental statute, while regarding the earlier attempts as
less effective. These earlier attempts are nicely summarized in Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63-67 (1975).
53 Wilcox, supra note 9, at 15.
54 See id.
55 See Kenneth L. Hirsch & Steven Abramovitz, Clearing the Air: Some Legal
Aspects of Interstate Air Pollution Problems, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 53, 68-69 (1979);
Wilcox, supra note 9, at 15. In fact, the EPA promulgated regulations that only
required upwind states to inform downwind states of any actions that might significantly
affect the downwind state's air quality. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.21(c) (1977). These
regulations were challenged and upheld as an acceptable interpretation of the 1970
CAA. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 691, 695 (8th
Cir. 1973).
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2. The 1977Amendments
The EPA interpretation of the 1970 CAA led to a change in the
statute's language in the 1977 CAAA. 56 Congress required that when
submitting a SIP for approval, a state must have addressed the potential for
interstate pollutant migration and, further, must have enacted provisions to
deal with this problem.57 In addition, Congress added a new section in the
1977 CAAA that provided a means for petitioning the EPA when a state
believed its noncompliance problems stemmed from pollution generated in
another state.58 Upon "a finding that a major source in another state
emitted ... a[n] [interstate] air pollutant," the EPA could act to enjoin or
control the emissions in the source state. 59
These improvements over the 1970 law, however, proved to be
insufficient to control interstate ozone problems. 60 One author has
identified four major limitations on the EPA's ability to proactively
address an interstate air pollution problem under the 1977 CAAA.61
First, the EPA was given no statutory standard or guideline as to the
quantity of emissions from an upwind state that would establish a
violation of the law.62 Second, the law only permitted the EPA to act
regarding emissions from stationary sources.63 Third, once a SIP was
approved, the EPA had no means to re-review SIP interstate pollution
control measures if it determined that the source state was violating the
56 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
57 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 18 & n.95.
58 See id. at 18-19.
59 Id. This petition mechanism was provided for in section 126 of the 1977 CAAA.
See 91 Stat. at 724.
60 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 23-24 (noting that downwind states attempting to
petition the EPA for a finding that an upwind source emitted an interstate air pollutant
that impacted on the downwind states' attainment status all experienced failure because
of the scientific difficulty of proving that an individual source actually significantly
contributed to the downwind states' nonattainment).
61 See id. at 18-24.
62 See id. at 19 (citing Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1076
(6th Cir. 1984)).
63 See id. at 20 (citing RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 498 (2d ed. 1978)). This limitation left the EPA powerless as to
ozone precursors generated by mobile sources. See id.
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law.64 Finally, the EPA could not act against sources in a state unless it
found that those sources "'significantly contribute[d]' to nonattainment in a
given area."' 65 These problems left the CAA relatively benign in its ability
to address interstate pollution. The door was open for Congress to reform
and strengthen the CAA in its next amendments.
3. The 1990 Amendments
Congress reacted in the 1990 CAAA to the stubborn ozone pollution
problems of many metropolitan areas by strengthening existing ozone
control provisions and adding new measures directed to deal with interstate
pollution. 66 Specifically, the 1990 Act created the Northeast Ozone
Transport Region (NOTR) to address interstate ozone pollution problems in
the Northeast. 67 The NOTR is governed by the Northeast Ozone Transport
Commission (NOTC), which can petition the EPA upon a vote of a
majority of states to require ozone reduction measures universally in all
NOTR member states.68 This unique organization reflects Congress's
recognition that the ozone pollution problems of the Northeast can only be
addressed through interregional cooperation.
64 See id. (citing Timothy Talkington, Interstate Air Pollution Abatement and the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Balancing Interests, 62 U. CoLo. L. REv. 957,
964-967 (1991)).
65 Id. at 24. The EPA had "interpreted the term ['significantly contribute'] so
restrictively that," the "EPA effectively... eliminated the use of Section 126 to halt
interstate transport [of ozone] unless a state had a very high level of a pollutant from
another jurisdiction." Id. at 24, 26. The EPA's rulings on the exact level of a pollutant
necessary for a finding of significant contribution demonstrated that "as little as three
percent or as much as twenty percent contribution [from the upwind state] to
nonattainment for a given pollutant was not sufficient to constitute significant
contribution." Id. at 26 (citing Air Pollution Control Dist., 739 F.2d at 1077, 1093;
New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1065
(1989)).
66 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 751 1c(a) (mandating the formation of a "single transport region
for ozone.., comprised of the States of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and the... District of Columbia").
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c)(1); see also Wilcox, supra note 9, at 28-30.
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In addition, the EPA was given authority to reject a SIP if its provisions
did not address interstate ozone pollution. 69 Although this authority was
originally granted in the 1977 CAAA, the 1990 amendments expanded the
scope of emissions from those emitted by "sources" to those emitted by any
"other type of emissions activity." '70 This change in language expanded the
EPA's authority to require that a state's SIP address interstate ozone
precursors. 71 The 1977 CAAA-through its definition of "stationary
sources" 72-only required a SIP to address emissions from large stationary
sources; the 1990 amendments require that a SIP also address emissions
from small stationary sources and mobile sources. Finally, Congress left
largely unchanged the process by which an affected state may petition the
EPA for control of sources in another state. 73 However, the 1990 CAAA
process does allow the affected state to petition based on the impact of "a
group of major sources," rather than on the 1977 CAAA's more narrow
impact of "a single major source." 74
69 The EPA has indicated that it will use section 1 10(a)(2)(D) and section 1 10(k)(5)
of the 1990 CAAA, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7410(k)(5), to "find that a SIP is
substantially inadequate to ... mitigate interstate transport" of ozone if the upwind
state fails to address the problem with appropriate vigor in its SIP. Finding of
Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport
Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62
Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,322 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed Nov. 7,
1997).
70 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i); see also Wilcox, supra note 9, at 31.
71 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 31.
72 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 111(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685, 770 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (1994)). The 1977 CAAA did
not change the definition of stationary sources, so that the relevant definition of
stationary sources remained limited to "any building, structure, facility, or installation."
Clean Air Act of 1970 § l1l(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (1994)).
73 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 33. The petition process is outlined in section 126
of the 1990 CAAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (1994). It should be noted, however, that
this process had never been used successfully in the earlier CAAAs to limit any upwind
ozone precursor generation. See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 24 (citing Talkington, supra
note 64, at 957).
74 Wilcox, supra note 9, at 33.
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II. THE STAKES AND POSITIONS IN INTERSTATE OZONE POLLUTION
A. The Start of Talks
In 1995, continued nonattainment of ozone National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS), 75 the sluggish adoption of required ozone
control measures, and difficulties in modelling ozone behavior in Northeast
states led the EPA to issue a memorandum directed at states with significant
ozone problems. 76 This document represented the EPA's compromise
between the difficulties Northeast states were having with implementation
of 1990 CAAA control measures and the growing perception among NOTR
members that the source of their ozone nonattainment problems lay in
upwind states.77
In the memorandum, the EPA directed states that significantly affect
interstate ozone migration to collaborate in developing strategies and
approaches designed to mitigate the interstate ozone pollution problem.78
The EPA further directed that if states failed to adopt reasonable methods
for controlling the interstate ozone problem within two years, then the EPA
would act under its statutory authority to require measures for ozone
control in state SIPs.79 Shortly thereafter, thirty-seven states and the
75 The EPA was required by the 1970 CAA to promulgate NAAQS for each "air
pollutant-emissions of which... cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)
(1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1994).
76 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,361 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51, 72, 75, 96). The memorandum was dated March 3, 1995 and targeted
Northeastern states that still failed to attain NAAQS in major metropolitan areas.
However, the memorandum was also sent to those states that might significantly
contribute to ozone nonattainment in the Northeast, directing those states to participate
in the OTAG process. See Final Rule Making Findings of Failure to Submit Required
State Implementation Plans for Nonattainment Areas for Ozone, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,292,
36,293 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). But see Finding of Significant
Contribution and Rulemaling for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment
Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at
57,361 (placing the date of the memorandum at March 2, 1995).
77 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 70-71.
78 See id.
79 See id.
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District of Columbia joined with the EPA to form the Ozone Transport
Assessment Group (OTAG). 80
B. The Goals of Negotiations
OTAG included state administrators, EPA officials, environmental
groups, and industry representatives. 8 1 The group sought to research and
understand the ozone and ozone precursor migration problem, identify
potential solutions to the problem, and agree upon voluntary compliance
schemes. 82 OTAG did-during its two years of existence-develop a
greater understanding of the interstate ozone pollution problem and
achieved agreed-upon, voluntary ozone control measures meant to alleviate
the Northeast ozone pollution problem. 83
However, one month after OTAG submitted its final report
recommending certain control measures, eight Northeast states petitioned
the EPA under section 126 of the CAA. 84 The Northeast states sought an
80 The first OTAG meeting was on May 18, 1995. See Finding of Significant
Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment
Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
60,318, 60,330 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed Nov. 7, 1997).
The thirty-seven states comprising OTAG include Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia. See id. at 60,320. The combined areas of these states together comprise the
OTAG region and were formed upon recommendation of the Environmental Council of
the States as an effort to explore and propose solutions to interstate ozone problems. See
id. at 60,318, 60,323.
81 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 70; see also Ozone Transport Assessment Group,
Technical Support Document, Final Report (visited Mar. 23, 1999)
<http://www.epa.gov/ttnotagl/finalrpt/preface/preface.htm>.
82 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,330; Wilcox, supra note 9, at 70; see also
Ozone Transport Assessment Group, supra note 19.
83 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,330.
84 The eight states petitioning the EPA are listed supra, note 1. The petitions were
filed pursuant to section 126 of the 1990 CAAA and sought a finding by the EPA that
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EPA ruling that certain Midwest states were contributors to Northeastern
ozone problems. 85 Further, the states requested that the EPA adopt
regulatory controls for the Midwest states.8 6
The filing of the section 126 petitions signals a failure in the OTAG
negotiations to reach consensus among all parties. Without such consensus,
states that sought more stringent control measures or a wider scope of
controlled sources would abandon voluntary measures and petition the EPA
to exercise rulemaking authority under the 1990 CAAA. To understand
why OTAG efforts at voluntary, consensual ozone control measures failed,
it is necessary to examine the interests of the involved parties, the issues
upon which agreement was reached, the issues still in dispute, and the
important factors that led the eight Northeast states to petition the EPA for
intervention.
C. The Interests of the Parties
The most significant parties to the OTAG negotiations included the
EPA, the Northeast Ozone Transport Region member states, and other
states from the Midwest and South.8 7 These parties presented both
conflicting and agreed-upon interests. Most important among the agreed-
upon interests, and one underlying the entire subsequent discussion, was
the desire to solve unresolved factual, scientific, and legal questions
regarding interstate ozone pollution.
OTAG addressed this interest through a strong commitment to research
and modelling aimed at understanding the degree to which ozone and ozone
precursors migrate across the eastern United States. 88 In addition, OTAG
commissioned considerable research into various economic and
major sources of NO, emissions in Midwestern and Southern states significantly
contribute to ozone nonattainment in the Northeast. See Final Determination to Extend
Deadline for Promulgation of Action on Section 126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,769,
54,770 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). If the EPA were to so find, those
major stationary sources would be required to cease emissions or adhere to compliance
schedules adopted by the EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c) (1994).
85 See Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on
Section 126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 54,770.
86 See id.
87 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,318.
88 See id. at 60,330; see also Ozone Transport Assessment Group, supra note 19.
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technological control measures that might be adopted in dealing with the
ozone transport problem.89 Although states did not agree upon which
models and which policies were best suited to interstate ozone, the efforts
and resources directed at researching the science and exploring control
mechanisms underscores the commitment of all states to attempting to solve
ozone problems through a voluntary, consensus-building approach. 90
1. EPA Interests
The EPA initiated the OTAG negotiations through its 1995
memorandum. 91 The EPA recognized the difficulties Northeast states had
in implementing ozone control measures, the persistent ozone
noncompliance in these states, and the growing scientific evidence pointing
to upwind ozone precursor contribution. 92 These factors pointed to the need
for control measures in upwind states. However, implementation of such
controls could only be achieved through SIP modification. 93 The work of
reviewing the SIPs of all upwind states presented a daunting task for the
EPA. Consequently, the EPA turned to the states involved for a solution
addressing interstate ozone problems.
In addition to the potential burden of widespread SIP revision, the EPA
faced the difficult task of finding means for ozone compliance in Northeast
states. Difficulties in modelling ozone behavior in the Northeast and
looming deadlines for ozone control measures mandated by the 1990
CAAA left the EPA without an effective tool for controlling this persistent
89 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,330; see also Ozone Transport Assessment
Group, supra note 19.
90 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,330.
91 See id. at 60,323, 60,330; see also discussion supra notes 76-79 and
accompanying text (discussing the 1995 memorandum, its directives, and its
implications).
92 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 68-70 (noting that the EPA modified CAA
deadlines for Northeast states in "response to modeling delays and other complications
caused in part by ozone transport").
93 See id. at 69.
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problem.94 One of the few control measures still available lay in turning to
sources of ozone precursors outside the Northeast.
However, the unilateral imposition of ozone controls on states in the
Midwest was bound to lead to protracted litigation over the EPA's authority
to so act.95 Such a delay could further limit the EPA's ability to effectively
deal with the Northeast ozone problems. Therefore, in 1995, the EPA
viewed the consensual negotiation process afforded by OTAG as preferable
to mandated controls. OTAG negotiations and any voluntary compliance
derived therefrom would protect the following EPA interests: (1)
94 See id. at 68-69.
95 See id. at 73-74 (noting that parties on both sides found the EPA's extension of
compliance demonstration deadlines and assertion that the EPA could statutorily require
Midwest SIPs to account for interstate transport of ozone unfavorable and legally
challengeable). However, it should be noted that the EPA since initiated rulemaking
designed to impose ozone controls on states in the Midwest and South. See generally
Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for
Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,292 (1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 97) (proposed Oct. 21, 1998). This rulemaking was
completed on October 27, 1998. See Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,356
(1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96).
This rulemaking activity is independent and separate from the ongoing EPA
rulemaking regarding the section 126 petitions. First, the rulemaking meant to adopt
OTAG's recommendations requires that states amend their SIPs so that no state will
exceed certain baseline ozone precursor emission levels. See id. at 57,450. Second, the
separate rulemaling regarding the section 126 petitions is meant to determine whether
the stationary sources identified in the petitions significantly contributes to ozone
nonattainment problems in the petitioning states. See id. at 57,361.
This second rulemaling-on the section 126 petitions-while also designed to limit
production of upwind ozone precursors, is not without the potential for protracted
litigation. There is a cloud on the EPA's alleged authority to act under section 126 of
the CAAA. Many of the states that would be subject to stricter emission limits and
controls have challenged the EPA's interpretation of section 126. See Findings of
Significant Contribution and Rulemaling on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of
Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,058, 24,075-24,076 (1998) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). Further-and more puzzling to this Author's
understanding of a federal agency's statutory interpretation authority-the EPA's
interpretation of section 126 is that the language of the statute be "considered to be a
typographical error." Id. at 24,076. The EPA proposes curing this "typographical
error" by reading section 126 as referencing a wholly different subsection of section 110
of the CAAA than was referenced by the statute as enacted. See id. It is most interesting
that Congress-the body that enacted the 1990 CAAA-has not seen fit to cure this
"typographical error" in the nine years since its passage.
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conserving administrative resources by avoiding widespread SIP review
and (2) speedily eliminating the persistent Northeast ozone pollution
problem through resolution outside of the courtroom.
2. Northeast States' Interests
In 1995, the Northeast states faced severe ozone precursor control
measures due to continued NAAQS nonattainment. 96 Many of these states
adopted rigorous abatement procedures in their last SIP revisions and
further efforts to control ozone precursor generation would entail costly
vehicle emissions control programs, reformulated gasolines, and further
reduction measures for stationary sources. 97 In response to pressure from
the EPA to submit SIPs adopting these additional controls and in response
to looming deadlines for meeting previously approved staged emissions
reductions, 98 the Northeast states began to press the EPA for action on the
interstate ozone problem. 99
Without adequately addressing interstate ozone transport, Northeast
states faced the possibility of continued NAAQS noncompliance regardless
of the emission control measures adopted within their states.100 Given the
economic costs of emission control measures,10 1 a continued economic lag
96 These states faced EPA mandates that SIPs contain rate of progress (ROP)
reductions. These ROPs entail strict percentage reductions in ozone precursor emissions
each year, regardless of the method chosen to achieve the reductions. See Final Rule
Making Findings of Failure to Submit Required State Implementation Plans for
Nonattainment Areas for Ozone, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,292, 36,293 (1996) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
97 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 46 & n.257, 47 (noting the political unpopularity of
automobile emissions testing programs and the required use of reformulated gasolines);
Lobsenz, supra note 24 (indicating that an NO, compact between the Northeastern
states was already extreme in its forced NO, reductions-further reductions would have
been difficult to achieve).
98 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the NO, emission
reduction compact negotiated among the NOTR states through the NOTC).
99 Specifically, "Massachusetts alleged that the EPA policy merely allowed upwind
states to 'shirk responsibility' for the effects of transport on downwind jurisdictions."
Wilcox, supra note 9, at 68 (quoting State Cooperative Effort to Investigate Ozone
Transport Solutions, INSIDE EPA, May 17, 1995).
100 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 70 (noting that much of the reason why Northeast
states could not achieve the CAA ozone attainment deadlines, regardless of the control
measures adopted, was that the interstate transport problem persisted).
101 See supra notes 25, 40 and accompanying text (describing the costly emission
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in the Northeast,10 2 and severe localized ozone pollution problems in
various cities, 10 3 one of the few options left for the Northeast states lay in
considering petitions under section 126 to force EPA adjudication of the
interstate ozone migration issue. 104
Although these states recognized the potential for protracted litigation
on such a petition, the alternatives were bleak. NOx levels had already been
capped in the NOTR, 10 5 the 1990 CAAA forced adoption of mandatory
ozone control measures,10 6 and the EPA's proposal for further reductions
drew considerable criticism from Northeast industry representatives. 1
07
The EPA's proposal to form OTAG represented a compromise the
Northeast states could live with. On the one hand, the interstate ozone
problem would be addressed, albeit informally, by the EPA and those states
viewed as the sources of interstate ozone precursors. The Northeast states
could participate in the process and have an opportunity to air concerns and
influence the outcome. On the other hand, OTAG might take up to two
years to reach conclusions and adopt recommended control measures.
This balance was tipped in OTAG's favor by an additional element of
the EPA's proposal. In return for Northeast participation in OTAG, the
EPA would indirectly extend the deadline for demonstration of attainment
control measures that the EPA required Northeast states to adopt and their ensuing
unpopularity with the public).
102See KATHLEEN O'LEARY MORGAN ET AL., STATE RANKINGS 1998: A
STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE 50 UNITED STATES 97 (1998) (reporting that between 1987
and 1994, the nine states of the Northeast-Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont-all
showed growth rates in average annual gross state product below the national average).
103 See Helms et al., supra note 12, at 213 fig.1.
104The EPA had already accepted an "80% Rule" whereby the EPA would
conditionally accept a noncompliant state's SIP if it demonstrated that control measures
to achieve at least 80 % of the reduction necessary for attainment had been adopted. See
Wilcox, supra note 9, at 65. If a state was unable to show adoption of these 80%
measures, the only alternative available for immediate action to dissipate interstate
ozone migration was through the section 126 petition process. See 42 U.S.C. § 7426
(1994).
105 See Lobsenz, supra note 24.
106 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 46 (noting that "the severity of ozone" problems
in the Northeast coupled with the "numerous obligations upon" Northeast states under
the 1990 CAAA have driven some Northeast states to look to more stringent California
emissions standards and California new vehicle emissions requirements as possible
ameliorating measures).
107 See id. at 68.
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with ozone NAAQS. l08 Thus, the OTAG negotiations and the voluntary
control measures that might be adopted from them protected the following
Northeast interests: (1) ensuring that interstate ozone migration is reduced
through control measures in upwind states, (2) reducing ozone levels in the
Northeast so that complete NAAQS attainment would be achieved, and (3)
mitigating the economic impact of extreme ozone control measures.
3. Upwind States' Interests
Prior to the 1990 CAAA, states with limited, localized ozone pollution
problems had only been required to adopt ozone control measures
necessary to achieve NAAQS where local nonattainment occurred. 10 9
However, in the early 1990s, the repeated calls for control of ozone and
ozone precursors generated in the states of the Midwest and South led to a
perception that the EPA might act against states upwind of the Northeast.
Consequently, many of the Midwest states voiced objection to potential
regulation.110 Most cited questionable scientific proof that ozone precursors
generated in the Midwest might have an impact on Northeastern ozone
problems.' 11
Another important element of the upwind states' objection lay in
economic conditions. Both the South and the Midwest enjoyed significant
economic and population growth in the early 1990s. 112 These two factors
108 Although the EPA did not actually extend the deadline for attainment in these
states, it did adopt a policy which "provides additional time for submission of complete
attainment demonstrations." Id. at 69. This means that the Northeast states will have
additional time to submit plans to achieve attainment, but the deadlines for achieving
attainment will remain the same as statutorily dictated. However, states are given
certain time allotments for implementing the plans once submitted, so that, in effect, the
enforceable attainment deadline was delayed. See Finding of Significant Contribution
and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region
for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,318-
60,323 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed Nov. 7, 1997).
109 See Nichols, supra note 1, at 1-B; see also Helms, supra note 12, at 213.
110 See Jim Nichols, Findings Cloud Pollution Theories: Midwest Smog May Not
Drift to the Northeast, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 2, 1996, at I-A.
III See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 73 n.423 (citing mixed results from modelling
studies of interstate ozone movement); Nichols, supra note 110. See generally Tom
Arrandale, The Ozone Experiment, GOVERNING, Nov. 1996, at 84.
112 See 1 THOMAS G. EXTER, REGIONAL MARKETS: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF
GROWTH AND DECLINE 9 (1999) (reporting that predicted population growth between
1990 and 2000 for the Northeast is merely 2.1%, whereas in the Midwest population
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led to increased industrial output and increased vehicular operation in these
areas. 113 As noted earlier, fossil fuel based industrial activity, power
generation, and automobile operation are the most significant sources of
ozone precursors." 4 Consequently, efforts to control emissions of ozone
precursors could have a significant impact on the economies of upwind
states, effectively stifling the economic expansion these regions enjoyed." 5
The final element influencing upwind objection to potential control
measures lay in the mechanism by which the EPA could be petitioned to act
against the interstate ozone precursors generated in upwind states. Namely,
while section 126 afforded a means for Northeast states to petition for EPA
intervention, no section 126 petition had ever successfully resulted in
reduction of an upwind state's pollution to benefit a downwind receiver
state. 116
However, the 1990 CAAA changed the standard under which the EPA
can disapprove a SIP due to insufficient control measures addressing the
downwind impact of interstate pollution." 7 Consequently, some question
remained as to whether the EPA could now act against upwind states under
will grow 6.1% and, even more significantly, in the South will grow 14.6%); MORGAN
ET1 AL., supra note 102, at 97. Of the twelve states in the Midwest-Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin-half reported average annual growth rates in gross state
product above the national average for the period of 1987 to 1994. See id. Collectively,
the twelve states of the Midwest showed an average growth rate equal to the national
average. See id. Of the sixteen states in the South-Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia-eleven
reported average annual growth in gross state product above the national average for the
period of 1987 to 1994. See id. Collectively, the sixteen states showed a growth rate
above the national average. See id.
113 See Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?,
17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 167 (1998) (noting that as populations shift from the
Northeast to the Midwest and Sun Belt due to economic growth in those regions, a
corresponding increase in automobile activity has ensued).
114 See supra notes 16-18, 38 and accompanying text.
115 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
116 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 23 (noting that all section 126 petitions in the past
have failed due to the relative difficulty in proving with scientific accuracy that an
individual source of ozone precursors actually significantly contributed to the downwind
state's nonattainment status).
117 See id. at 31.
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the 1990 CAAA.118 Nevertheless, the potential for protracted litigation and
adverse results were significant elements driving the upwind states'
objection to Northeast calls for action regarding interstate ozone pollution.
The EPA memorandum that established OTAG 119 acted persuasively to
involve states from the Midwest and South. If these states refused to
participate in OTAG, then the EPA proposed acting under the 1990 CAAA
to disapprove SIPs until the SIPs adequately addressed the interstate
impacts of pollution generated in the Midwestern and Southern states. 1
20
118 See id. at 31-32. However, the EPA has indicated that it finds no ambiguity in
the statutory language and believes that it has full authority under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7410(k)(5) to act against a SIP found "substantially inadequate
to... mitigate interstate transport" of ozone to downwind states. Finding of Significant
Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment
Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
60,318, 60,318, 60,322 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed Nov. 7,
1997).
It is less clear what the EPA's authority is in regards to the remedy granted to a
state petitioning under section 126 of the CAA. The EPA has identified two possible
readings of section 126. See Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on
Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed.
Reg. 24,058, 24,075-24,076 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). First, the
language of section 126 could be read as enacted by Congress so that states "may
petition EPA for a finding that specified sources in other States emit air pollutants 'in
violation of the prohibition of section [7410(a)(2)(D)(ii)] of this title or this section.'"
Id. at 24,075 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (1994)). This reading of section 126 would
permit "a State to file a petition with EPA only to force other States to meet the
requirements of section 126 itself, (i.e., the requirement in section 126(a) that SIPs
include provisions to require new and modified major stationary sources to give
preconstruction notification to nearby States under certain circumstances)." Id. at
24,076. Second, the language of section 126 could "instead... be considered to be a
typographical error that should be read to refer to section 1 10(a)(2)(D)(i)." Id. The
effect of this reading would be to allow states to petition the EPA to find that another
state's SIP was inadequate to control pollutants that may be contributing significantly to
nonattainment problems in the petitioning state. See id. The EPA appears to favor this
second reading. See id. This Author finds it very strange that the EPA would find
typographical errors in the statute as passed by Congress when the enacted language
would clearly provide some remedy for petitioning states.
119 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing and describing the
EPA's 1995 memorandum).
120 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 70-73; see also Finding of Significant
Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment
Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at
60,322, 60,323.
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Therefore, participation in OTAG protected the following interests of
the Midwest, and South: (1) establishing sound scientific proof for the extent
and basis of interstate ozone pollution through OTAG's research efforts, (2)
consideration of the economic and growth factors facing these states
through a multistate participatory and consensual research process, and (3)
avoiding litigation expenses and potential adverse rulings under a section
126 petition to the EPA.
D. The Parties' BATNAs121
In addition to the parties' interests in the interstate ozone problem, an
essential element to understanding why OTAG's recommendations were not
adopted lies in the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (the BATNA)
faced by each adverse party. In the Northeast, states faced imposition of
difficult and costly pollution abatement procedures if ozone NAAQS
nonattainment continued.1 22 Most states in the Northeast viewed interstate
ozone as, at the least, a contributing factor in NAAQS nonattainment. In
fact, there was some question in the Northeast whether the costly abatement
procedures could achieve NAAQS attainment without some effort to
control interstate ozone sources.123 Therefore, the Northeast states
anticipated that control of interstate sources would alleviate at least some, if
not most, of their continued ozone nonattainment problems.
Framing the issue in this context, the Northeast viewed control of
interstate ozone, whether by agreement or by EPA regulation, as the
ultimate goal. Hence, these states saw a section 126 petition to the EPA and
the possible litigation ensuing therefrom as their BATNA on interstate
ozone pollution. If a section 126 petition failed to produce significant EPA
control measures addressing interstate ozone migration, the Northeast states
faced an extremely costly pollution control burden.
In the Midwest and South, on the other hand, the alternatives to
successful OTAG negotiations were less clear. Although a section 126
petition had never successfully limited a state's SIP procedures, 124 the cost
121 BATNA is an acronym for "Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement." See
Roy J. LEwIcIU ET AL., NEGOTIATION 29 (2d ed. 1994) (citing FISHER E" AL., GETTING
TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 105 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed.
1991)).
122 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 41, 46 & n.257, 47.
123 See id. at 68 (noting that some states felt their compliance depended on control
of upwind ozone precursor sources).
124 See id. at 23.
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of litigation and the potential for EPA regulations that did not account for
economic or growth conditions were a significant impetus for seeking a
negotiated agreement. Consequently, the Midwest and South BATNA may
be characterized as long and costly litigation with an uncertain outcome.
Comparison of the two adverse BATNAs provides substantial
explanation for why the Northeast states initiated the section 126 petitions
in the face of OTAG's final recommendations. It appears that the Northeast
states viewed section 126 petition and litigation that might result in
substantial interstate ozone reductions as preferable to OTAG negotiated
control measures that would result in minimal interstate ozone reductions.
Thus, if OTAG recommendations were viewed as insufficient to reduce
Northeast ozone problems in an amount that would offset some of the
costly ozone abatement measures Northeast states faced, then Northeast
states would most likely abandon OTAG efforts and petition the EPA under
section 126 for relief.
Similarly, states in the Midwest and South appear to have viewed
certain OTAG negotiated control measures that would account for
economic and growth conditions in the Midwest and South as preferable to
possible section 126 petitions and ensuing EPA regulation that would not
account for economic and growth conditions. Consequently, these states
would attempt to stand behind OTAG efforts and play a greater role in
establishing control measures, even if those control measures were viewed
as somewhat more stringent than absolutely necessary to mitigate interstate
ozone problems.
III. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN UPWIND AND DOWNWIND STATES
A. OTAG Achievements
OTAG first met in May 1995 and organized itself into six workgroups
designed to understand the science behind interstate ozone transport, to
determine the degree to which ozone transport occurs in the eastern United
States, and to develop recommendations that member states could adopt to
remedy interstate ozone problems. 125 The OTAG Policy Group voted on all
recommendations made to the EPA regarding those measures that should be
125 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,330; Ozone Transport Assessment Group,
supra note 19; OTAG's Organizational Chart (visited Mar. 23, 1999)
<http://www.epa.gov/ttnotagl/finalrpt/chpl/graphics/orgchart.htm>.
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adopted to control interstate ozone problems. Final recommendations were
made with each state having one vote, and environmental commissioners
from each state, or their proxies, made that vote. 1
26
OTAG completed its work in June 1997 and submitted final
recommendations to the EPA on July 8, 1997.127 These recommendations
represent those areas of the interstate ozone problem upon which the Policy
Group agreed. Most significant among the final recommendations are the
following scientific findings and policy suggestions:
* Regional NOx reductions have a positive impact on reducing ozone
throughout the region.
* Ozone reductions are greatest in the locality where emissions are
reduced and ozone reductions decrease as the distance from the
emission reduction increases.
* All types of NO× reductions are effective at reducing ozone.
* Ozone itself is transported, and ozone generated on one day persists
and migrates on subsequent days.
* Ozone is transported over a longer range in the North than in the
South.
* Utilities and nonutilities should reduce NOx emissions to specified
control levels.
* The EPA should continue to require use of reformulated gasoline in
specified areas.
* The EPA should establish an NOx emission trading market to reduce
compliance costs.
* The EPA should continue to require automobile emissions inspections
and maintenance programs in specified areas. 128
These recommendations achieve some of the parties' interests identified
above. Namely, for the Northeast states, the OTAG recommendations
establish a causal relationship between control measures in upwind states
and the reduction of ozone in downwind states, and the recommendations
126 See Ozone Transport Assessment Group, supra note 19.
127 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,323.
128 See Ozone Transport Assessment Group, supra note 19; see also Finding of
Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport
Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62
Fed. Reg. at 60,320, 60,376-60,379.
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propose adoption of additional NOx controls in upwind states. Less
directly, by supporting ozone controls in upwind states, the OTAG
recommendations move closer to the Northeast states' interest in reducing
Northeast ozone levels so that NAAQS attainment is possible. However,
the OTAG recommendations do not address a means for mitigating the
economic impact of the Northeast's extreme ozone control measures.
With regard to the interests of the Midwest and South, the OTAG
negotiations established clear scientific proof of a link between ozone
precursors generated in upwind regions and the ozone pollution problems
of the Northeast. In addition, OTAG recommended specific control
measures for certain pollutants. Based on the participation of the Midwest
and South, OTAG's recommendations should reflect, at least in part,
economic and growth factors these regions find important. Finally, the
OTAG recommendations represent a viable alternative to the costly
litigation and potentially adverse results inherent in section 126 petitions.
B. Section 126 Petitions
The section 126 petitions filed by eight Northeast states seek an EPA
finding that the stationary sources identified in the petitions "contribute
significantly to a downwind nonattainment. ' 129 If the EPA does make such
a finding, then the EPA, not the state environmental agency usually
regulating the stationary source, will issue direct control measures for the
source. 130 To date, the EPA has not made a final finding regarding the
eight petitions. The EPA's initial actions included three extensions of the
deadline for taking final action on the petitions.' 3 ' The EPA then
announced, in a notice of proposed rulemaking, an intention to find that
some of the upwind stationary sources identified in the eight section 126
129 Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,329.
130 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 126, 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (1994); see
also Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of
Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,329.
131 See Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on
Section 126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,769, 54,769 (1997) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt.
52); Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on Section 126
Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,914, 61,914 (1997) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 52); Final
Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on Section 126 Petitions,
63 Fed. Reg. 26, 26 (1998) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 52).
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petitions were significantly contributing to ozone noncompliance in the
downwind petitioning states. 132 A final ruling is currently scheduled for
April 30, 1999,133 but the EPA has indicated that other factors may
postpone final action to an even later date. 134
Two important limitations exist in a section 126 petition procedure. The
first limitation is the necessity of a finding that a stationary source in an
upwind state "contributes significantly" to ozone problems in a downwind
state. 135 It is particularly difficult to verify that ozone precursors produced
132 See Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemakings on Section 126
Petitions and Federal Implementation Plans for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,213, 52,213 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 97,
98) (proposed Sept. 30, 1998) ("[The] EPA is proposing to find that portions of certain
petitions are technically meritorious under... section 126."); see also Findings of
Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of
Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,058, 24,058 (1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
133 See Correction and Clarification to the Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg.
71,220, 71,221 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 96) (establishing that "the
[pollutant emission] budgets for the section 126 final rulemaking... must be finalized
by April 30, 1999").
134 See Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126
Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,292,
56,294-56,295 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 97) (proposed Oct. 21,
1998). The primary factor postponing this decision is an ongoing rulemaking through
which the EPA is adopting the OTAG recommendations for ozone precursor emission
controls. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,356 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51, 72, 75, 96). Once these OTAG recommendations are adopted in an EPA rule,
the states in the OTAG region will be required to amend their SIPs to account for these
new rules and, thus, to amend their SIPs to provide additional controls on ozone
precursor emissions from all sources-both stationary and mobile-within the state. See
id. at 57,358. Before the EPA issues a final rule on the section 126 petitions, the EPA
would like to review the amended SIPs and determine what impact the amended SIPs
might have on controlling ozone precursor generation from the stationary sources
targeted by the section 126 petitions. See Findings of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,294-56,295.
135 42 U.S.C. § 7426; see also Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking
for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,329; Wilcox, supra note 9,
at 24 (citing such a finding as "perhaps the most crucial limitation of Section 126").
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by a particular source contribute to a downwind state's ozone
nonattainment. 136 Second, section 126 petitions only permit the EPA to
control emissions from "any major source or group of stationary
sources. ' 137 This severely limits the EPA's ability to deal with ozone,
because the sources of ozone precursors include mobile sources, such as
automobiles and smaller fossil fuel burning industries. 138
In light of the parties' interests, discussed above, there were incentives
for filing these petitions. One of the Northeast states' interests lies in
seeking upwind control measures significant enough to substantially reduce
ozone nonattainment problems in the Northeast. Although the EPA is
unable under section 126 to control emissions from mobile sources and
smaller stationary sources, it may impose significant control measures on
major stationary sources through the section 126 petition process. 139 These
significant control measures could, in turn, serve as a benchmark standard
for later SIP revisions by upwind states.140 Thus, the EPA would set a high
standard for stationary sources that could influence the states' treatment of
smaller stationary sources and mobile sources at a later date.
136 Prior to the current section 126 petitions, no state has successfully passed this
hurdle. It is extremely difficult to scientifically prove that the ozone precursors emitted
by a single upwind stationary source actually contribute in some way to a downwind
state's nonattainment. See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 24.
137 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b); see also Wilcox, supra note 9, at 32.
138 See MCKEE, supra note 16, at 5; Helms et al., supra note 12, at 211. Although
this statutory language expands on the 1977 CAAA, which only permitted action against
any major source, the impact of including groups of stationary sources may have limited
effect because a definition incorporating the "groups of stationary sources" language
had already been adopted by the EPA in its interpretation of section 126, and no state
had successfully maintained an action under that definition. See Wilcox, supra note 9, at
33.
139 When the EPA finds that an upwind major stationary source significantly
contributes to a downwind ozone nonattainment problem, then the EPA, not the upwind
state, either shuts the source down or adopts a compliance schedule for the major
stationary source. See 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c). The EPA has indicated that if the section
126 petitions are granted, "selection and imposition of controls directly on" the targeted
stationary sources would result. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for
Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,329.
140 The EPA hopes that "[t]hese controls could provide a template for the SIP
provisions the States must include in their" response to the EPA's adoption of OTAG
proposals. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,329.
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Consequently, the Northeast states would achieve through petition what
was not achieved through a consensual, voluntary negotiation process.
However, this strategy could fail on a number of counts. First, it is entirely
possible that the EPA could find that, given available modelling techniques,
the stationary sources identified in the petitions do not contribute
significantly to ozone noncompliance in downwind states.' 4 ' Second, an
EPA finding of significant contribution might be challenged by the upwind
state or the stationary source. 142 Substantial delay and litigation costs might
ensue. Finally, even if the EPA does mandate substantial control measures
on stationary sources in upwind states, there is no guarantee that these
control measures will serve as a template for later SIP revisions in the
upwind state. SIPs are designed to give a state maximum flexibility in
achieving CAA standards. 143 If the state can demonstrate that less
substantial control measures for small stationary and mobile sources will
meet CAA standards, the state will be free to implement the less substantial
control measures. 144
141 After all, no state has successfully maintained an action under section 126. See
Wilcox, supra note 9, at 33. Further, the EPA has, in the past, adopted a very restricted
definition of "significantly contributes." See Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739
F.2d 1071, 1071 (6th Cir. 1984).
142 The basis for such litigation could be twofold. First an aggrieved state subject
to ozone precursor control measures might-as states have done in the past-challenge
the EPA's definition of what constitutes a significant contribution. See generally Air
Pollution Control Dist., 739 F.2d 1071. Second, the CAA appears to only authorize the
EPA to, upon a finding of significant contribution, "force [upwind] States to meet the
requirements of Section 126 itself, (i.e., the requirement in section 126(a) that SIPs
include provisions to require new and modified major stationary sources to give
preconstruction notification to nearby States under certain circumstances)." Findings of
Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of
Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,058, 24,076 (1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). Even given this statutory limitation, the EPA appears to
view its authority more broadly as an authorization to take specific emission control
actions against the stationary sources found to significantly contribute to downwind
ozone nonattainment. See id.
143 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1994)
(granting to the state the power to determine how to achieve "implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement of" NAAQS "within such State").
144 States are free to adopt those measures that they reasonably believe will lead to
NAAQS attainment. The EPA provides only "minimal guidance" to states in this
process. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,329.
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The approach taken by the Northeast states-petitioning the EPA under
section 126 rather than waiting for implementation of OTAG
recommendations-might, therefore, have little impact. However, the
section 126 petition approach imposes little risk when its likelihood of
success is balanced against the potential cost savings associated with
NAAQS attainment. If the Northeast states can achieve NAAQS attainment
through upwind ozone precursor reductions imposed by the EPA under
section 126, the economic costs and burdens of extreme ozone control
measures, identified above, 145 might be avoided immediately, rather than
sometime in the future when SIPs are revised.
Therefore, although the thirty-seven states involved in the OTAG
negotiations developed an agreed-upon course of action, it is easy to see
why the Northeast states rejected that course and acted to petition the EPA
under section 126. They chose the immediacy of the petition process,
pursuant to their BATNA, 146 because the EPA began the lengthy
rulemaking process necessary to adopt OTAG recommendations. 147 Thus,
even if the section 126 petitions failed to result in timely action against
upwind stationary sources, upwind states would eventually be forced to
comply with EPA regulations in their next scheduled SIP revisions. The
Northeast states had nothing to lose-and significant time advantages to
gain-in filing the section 126 petitions.
C. EPA Action in Response to OTAG Recommendations
Although the EPA has not yet ruled on the section 126 petitions, 148 it
has instituted proposed regulations meant to address the interstate transport
of ozone. 149 These regulations are based upon the OTAG final
145 See supra notes 25, 40 and accompanying text (describing the costly emission
control measures that the EPA required Northeast states to adopt and the ensuing
unpopularity of these control measures with the public).
146 See supra Part II.D (describing the parties' BATNAs).
147 See infra notes 148-155 and accompanying text (describing the EPA's
rulemaking and SIP revisions attendant to the rulemaking process necessary to adopt
OTAG's recommendations).
148 See discussion supra note 4 (describing the current status of the EPA's
rulemaking procedure).
149 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,318; Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for
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recommendations, but they deviate from the OTAG final recommendations
when the EPA felt an alternative regulatory course would better achieve
statutory compliance. 150 The regulations outline a series of ozone precursor
control measures to be adopted by twenty-two OTAG states and the District
of Columbia. 151
These measures will be implemented over the next several years. The
notice of proposed rulemaking was first published on November 7, 1997,
and the final rules were scheduled for adoption twelve months later.152 The
EPA adopted the final rules on October 27, 1998.153 States have been given
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,356
(1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96).
[The final rulemaking will] require 22 States and the District of Columbia to
submit State implementation plan ... revisions to prohibit specified amounts of
emissions of oxides of nitrogen (NOx)-one of the precursors to ozone (smog)
pollution-for the purposes of reducing NOx and ozone transport across State
boundaries in the eastern half of the United States.
Id. Additional information about the proposed regulations can be found in Reopening of
Emissions Inventory Comment Periods for the Findings of Significant Contribution and
Rulemakings on Section 126 Petitions and Federal Implementation Plans for Purposes of
Reducing Interstate Transport of Ozone, 64 Fed. Reg. 2416, 2416 (1999) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 97, 98) (establishing an extension of the comment period for parts
of the rulemaking due to technical difficulties with computer databases).
150 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,342. Usually, the EPA failed to follow OTAG
recommendations only when "[m]issing data in the OTAG emissions inventories...
preclude [the] EPA from precisely following the recommended" course of action. Id.
151 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemalting for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,356. These states include Alabama,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of
Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,320.
152 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,318 (noting that the "EPA is committed to
promulgate final action ... within 12 months").
153 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,356.
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twelve months to adopt these final rules into their SIPs 154 and, thus, have
been given twelve months to submit their "plans for meeting statewide
emission budgets" established under the final rule. 155 The EPA opted for
the twelve month period for SIP revision, although it is statutorily
authorized to provide a state with eighteen months in which to revise its
SIP. 156 EPA approval of the revised SIPs occurs within six months of a
revised SIP's submittal. 157 Therefore, the proposed control measures will
not be fully adopted until sometime in 2000.158 To further extend the date
when the Northeast states might actually see ozone transport relief, the
EPA will not require that states subject to ozone precursor emission
controls "achieve reductions in NOx emissions [until] May 1, 2003."159
Consequently, effective interstate ozone control measures may, through
rulemaking, be many years away.
Given this lengthy period of rulemaking, another reason for the filing
of section 126 petitions by the Northeast states may have been to accelerate
the adoption of interstate ozone controls. Once a section 126 petition is
filed with the EPA, the agency has six months to take a final action. 160 This
154 See id. at 57,451.
155 Id. at 57,450.
156 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 110(k)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5)
(1994). The EPA has established in its final rule that states would have only 12 months
to submit revised SIPs. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for
Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,451.
157 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(1)(B).
158 The 2000 date arises from a combination of the following implementation
stages: (1) notice of proposed rulemaking on November 7, 1997; (2) final rules adopted
on October 27, 1998; (3) adoption of final rules in state SIPs within 12 months, which
pushes the date to October 27, 1999; and (4) EPA approval of state SIPs within six
months, which places the final date on April 27, 2000. See supra notes 152-157 and
accompanying text.
159 Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,451.
160 The statute provides that the EPA is required to respond within 60 days to a
section 126 petition. See 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (1994). However, under different
provisions of the CAA, the EPA is given the discretion to extend any section 126
petition determination to six months. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(N), (d)(10) (1994).
Although, it should be noted that the EPA exceeded its six month allotment. It did not
take final action proposing a determination that the stationary sources identified in the
section 126 petitions did significantly contribute to downwind ozone nonattainment
problems until September 30, 1998-a full thirteen months after the section 126
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final action involves the following: (1) a determination that certain major
stationary sources in upwind states contribute significantly to downwind
ozone NAAQS nonattainment and (2) adoption of a schedule of proposed
EPA rulemaking for control measures that must be adopted at these
stationary sources. 161
The rulemaking process would then go through required proposal,
notice and comment, and final rule adoption stages before control measures
were implemented at the targeted upwind stationary sources. 162
Consequently, if the EPA had acted quickly to determine whether the
stationary sources contribute significantly to downwind nonattainment and
these targeted stationary sources did not challenge a ruling, final EPA
control measures could have been implemented in as little as three to six
months. 163 This is substantially quicker than the three-year rulemaking
process required to adopt OTAG recommendations, as outlined above. 164
By using the section 126 petition process to ensure more timely
adoption of ozone precursor controls in upwind states, the Northeastern
states could have achieved all three of their primary interests identified
above. There would be a reduction in the interstate ozone pollution
problem, which would bring the Northeast states closer to NAAQS
attainment. Furthermore, if attainment could be achieved, the most costly
and burdensome of local ozone control measures might have been avoided.
petitions were initially filed. See Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemakings
on Section 126 Petitions and Federal Implementation Plans for Purposes of Reducing
Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,213, 52,213 (1998) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 52, 97, 98) (proposed Sept. 30, 1998).
161 See 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c).
162 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3). The final rule is due to be announced on April 30,
1999. See Correction and Clarification to the Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg.
71,220, 71,221 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 96).
163 However, if the EPA had used the full six months at its discretion, under 42
U.S.C. §§ 7607(d)(1)(N) and 7607(d)(10), in determining whether there was significant
contribution, the process could have taken closer to twelve months. In actual practice,
the process will not be complete until the EPA issues its final rule on April 30, 1999-
approximately 20 months after the section 126 petitions were first filed. See Correction
and Clarification to the Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 71,221.
164 See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
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D. Potential Results of the Section 126 Petitions
To date, no state has ever successfully petitioned the EPA to institute
controls against an upwind, out-of-state polluter under section 126.165 The
EPA has, in the past, interpreted the meaning of "significantly
contributes"' 166 very restrictively, 167 and the technical constraints of
modelling have limited the ability of aggrieved states to demonstrate a
significant contribution. 168  Consequently, the historical precedent
established under section 126 does not bode well for the petitions filed by
the Northeast states.
However, the EPA may be willing to interpret the statutory language of
section 126 more broadly in light of the severe ozone nonattainment
problems experienced by Northeast states.169 In its memorandum directing
states to form OTAG, the EPA indicated that "if states [were] unable to
agree upon [control measures for interstate ozone] by the end of 1997, [the]
EPA [would] use its authority under Sections 126 and 110 to motivate
states to meet their attainment obligations.' 1 70 If the EPA believes that
section 126 would provide statutory authority to motivate states into control
of interstate ozone precursors, then presumably the EPA's section 126
definition of "significantly contributes"' 17 1 has become broad enough to
sustain an aggrieved state's petition.172
Indications from the EPA regarding the current status of the section
126 petitions conforms with this reasoning. The EPA has published three
165 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 24. As the EPA has yet to issue its final rule on
the section 126 petitions, there has still not been a successful use of section 126 of the
CAA by any aggrieved state.
166 42 U.S.C. § 7426(a)(1)(B).
167 See supra note 141.
168 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 22-27.
169 See id. at 70.
170 Id. (discussing the 1995 memorandum discussed, supra note 76) (citing
Memorandum Regarding Ozone Attainment Demonstrations from Mary D. Nichols,
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation to Regional Administrators, Regions I-X,
at 3 (Mar. 2, 1995)).
171 42 U.S.C. § 7426(a)(1)(B).
172 Because, as discussed supra, the EPA's historically restrictive interpretation of
"significantly contributes" has been one of the important factors in former section 126
petition rulings, see Wilcox, supra note 9, at 22-27, none of those section 126 petitions
has ever succeeded in moving the EPA to implement controls against an upwind, out-of-
state polluter. See id. at 24.
[Vol. 14:2 1999]
INTERSTATE OZONE POLLUTION AND NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
time extensions for announcing a final action regarding whether the major
upwind stationary sources identified in the section 126 petitions
significantly contribute to downwind ozone nonattainment. 173 Each of these
publications have cited a need to develop "an appropriate schedule for
rulemaking on the section 126 petitions" as an important factor in the
EPA's decision to extend deadlines for announcing a final action. 174 Thus,
it appears that the EPA, by developing a rulemaking schedule, intends to
engage in at least some rulemaking regarding the § 126 petitions. If the
EPA does engage in rulemaking, then at least some of the upwind states
will have to control emissions of ozone precursors from major stationary
sources found to significantly contribute to downwind ozone
nonattainment. 175
IV. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF
INTERSTATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
A. The Precedent of OTAG
The EPA views OTAG's negotiations and final recommendations as an
extremely successful model for state and federal cooperation in dealing
with interstate pollutants.176  The EPA characterizes OTAG as
"fundamentally different from previous efforts... to assess and solve air
pollution problems .... [T]he multistate, multistakeholder OTAG process
173 See Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on
Section 126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,769, 54,769 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 52); Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on Section
126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,914, 61,914 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52);
Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on Section 126
Petitions, 63 Fed. Reg. 26, 26 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
174 Final Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on Section
126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 54,770; Final Determination to Extend Deadline for
Promulgation of Action on Section 126 Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 61,915; Final
Determination to Extend Deadline for Promulgation of Action on Section 126 Petitions,
63 Fed. Reg. at 26.
175 The targeted upwind major stationary sources would be required to either cease
operations within three months or adhere to a "compliance schedule" adopted by the
EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c).
176 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,330 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 52) (proposed Nov. 7, 1997).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[engaged] the Federal Government [in looking] to the States involved to
provide the necessary technical information to aid in determining an
outcome which has local, regional and national implications." 177 In
recognition of this important role, the EPA has based its proposed ozone
transport regulations on OTAG's final recommendations.1 78
Because OTAG conducted "the most comprehensive analysis of ozone
transport ever conducted," much of the scientific basis for the EPA's
proposed regulations relies on data collected and modelling conducted in
the OTAG process.179 Based on this success, it is entirely conceivable, and
indeed, highly likely, that the EPA may adopt a multistate and
multistakeholder collaborative process in dealing with future interstate
pollution problems.
B. Improvements on the OTAG Model
Although OTAG has set a precedent for multiparty negotiated processes
in the interstate pollution arena, it did encounter problems. First, some
states became concerned with the development of final
recommendations. 180  These states theorized that votes by their
representatives in support of certain control measures might bind them to
unrealistic, inflexible mandatory regulations. 181 Such a concern could be
addressed before negotiations are initiated through a memorandum of
understanding or similar document signed by all parties. This document
would establish the goals and objectives of negotiations 182 as well as the
weights assigned to findings and recommendations from the negotiations. 183
177 Id.
178 See id.
179 Id.
180 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 73.
181 See Tom Arrandale, Ozone Study Group Ready to Set NO, Goal, GOvERNING,
June 1997, at 44 (noting that many of the OTAG "parties that have taken part in the
process would be happy to see it drag on for several more years, thereby putting off
some painful decisions"); see also Wilcox, supra note 9, at 73 (indicating that some
states had attempted to restrict the powers of their representatives to bind the state in
any proposals).
182 See HON. EUGENE F. LYNCH ET AL., NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT § 4.4
(1992) ("The range of possible [party] goals and objectives is limitless, but unless you
take the time to identify them in each case, the evaluation process will be incomplete.").
183 This initial stage of agreeing on the "basic rules governing the course of the
particular negotiation" is important because there are no "universal rules for
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In addition, some OTAG members contemplated withdrawing from the
negotiations.' 84 Fortunately, the EPA's stated intention to use statutory
provisions against any state that failed to participate completely with its
OTAG commitments prevented any withdrawals.1 85 However, future
interstate pollution negotiations could avoid dropouts by ensuring that all
stakeholders are involved in the negotiations, 186 that each has an equal
voice in any decisionmaking process, and that any stakeholder dropping out
of the process will be bound by negotiated terms, agreements, and
commitments. 1 87
negotiating[;] the applicable rules [are] whatever the parties agree upon." JEFFREY G.
MILLER & THOMAS R. COLOsI, FUNDAMENTALS OF NEGOTIATION: A GUIDE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROFESSIONALS 23 (1989).
184 Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota were reported to have
considered dropping out of the OTAG process, while Virginia and Illinois placed
restrictions on the ability of their representatives to participate in OTAG proposals. See
States Bailing Out of OTAG: Passing Laws to Limit Involvement, OCTANE WK., June
10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7053143. The Illinois restrictions are particularly
interesting in light of the fact that the OTAG Chair, Mary Gade, was an Illinois
representative from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. See Ozone Transport
Assessment Group, supra note 19.
185 See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 71-72.
186 It has been noted as fundamental to the art of dispute resolution that in
preparations for negotiation one must identify the parties involved:
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained
you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle.
CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 55 (3d ed.
1997) (quoting SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 18 (J. Clavell ed., 1983)).
187 Successful negotiation has been keyed upon the early inclusion of all involved
stakeholders. Equally important are a clear statement of the ground rules, process to be
followed, and likely ramifications of a negotiated decision presented at the start of the
negotiation process. See SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING
PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HANDLING CONFLICT AND REACHING
AGREEMENTS 112-113 (1988); see also LEWiCKI ET AL., supra note 121, at 133-135.
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C. Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in the Interstate
Pollution Context
OTAG made significant inroads in adapting negotiation to the interstate
pollution arena. Although negotiation may be the most commonly
employed method of dispute resolution in the environmental context, 188
mention of other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques sheds
light upon other approaches that might work successfully in this arena.
1. Dispute Resolution in the Interstate Pollution Context
Interstate pollution provides a unique problem for federal regulators. 189
Typically pitting the interests of one state or group of states against the
interests of another, interstate pollution regulation requires a complete
assessment of stakeholder interests and an understanding of the effects
proposed remedial actions may have on each stakeholder.1 90 Therefore,
complete participation by all affected parties is essential.' 9 ' Only by some
form of participation in the dispute resolution process are the full
complement of interests and influences a party may face completely
aired. 192 This is especially true when the underlying statutory authority
188 For example, the EPA uses negotiation to establish the parameters of a
proposed regulation prior to publication through negotiated rulemaking, many local
environmental disputes are negotiated to settlement, and increasingly, national
environmental problems are being solved through negotiation. See JANE MCCARTHY &
ALICE SHORETT, NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENTS: A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDIATION at ix-xi (1984); MILLER & COLOSI, supra note 183, at 1-4.
189 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the special problems faced
by regulators in the interstate pollution context).
190 See supra Parts II.C, II.D (assessing the stakeholder interests in the interstate
ozone transport context and analyzing the effects of various outcomes of OTAG's
negotiations).
191 See CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 187, at 112-113; LEWICKI ET AL.,
supra note 121, at 133-135.
192 Without identifying all of the parties, the negotiations are likely to have
"phantom players" that influence the negotiations indirectly through communication
with some participating parties. These phantom players can jeopardize the success of
negotiations by releasing information to the public at inopportune junctures or by
improperly influencing parties at sensitive moments. The best way to deal with these
phantom players is to listen to their views, make it clear that they are not parties to the
negotiation, and advise them during the course of the negotiation. See MILLER &
CoLosI, supra note 183, at 30-31. On the other hand, important public interest groups
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directs federal regulators to consider a limited number of factors in
decisionmaking.1 93 If a state places significant weight on factors other than
those enumerated in the statute, full participation ensures that all factors are
aired and considered in reaching a mutually acceptable solution. 194
2. The Role of a Mediator
Another important addition to the resolution of interstate pollution
disputes is inclusion of a mediator.1 95 In the OTAG negotiations, the EPA
could have played this role through its OTAG representatives. However, it
appears that the EPA chose instead to remain a party to the negotiations
given its ultimate role as promulgator of any regulations OTAG might
and concerned citizen groups may not seek to join the negotiation and, instead, plan on
articulating their positions after a settlement is reached, thereby attempting to
circumvent the negotiation process. Negotiators should assess the presence of these
groups and attempt to elicit their views. See id. 'at 31.
193 For example, in the CAA the EPA accounts only for human and environmental
health impacts when setting permissible NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)
(1994). The CAA fails to mandate that economic costs or impacts factor into the
equation, leaving many business leaders, politicians, and environmental practitioners to
accuse the EPA of adopting overly burdensome standards that do not strike a reasonable
balance between costs and benefits. See Lucinda Minton Langworthy, EPA's New Air
Quality Standards for Particulate Matter and Ozone: Boon for Health or Threat to the
Clean Air Act?, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,502, 10,506-10,507 (1998) (noting that the
predicted costs of new particulate and ozone standards are so high that members of
Congress have found, and the American public may find, the costs unacceptable;
predicting that these standards might lead to either reinterpretation of the CAA by the
EPA or amendments to the CAA by Congress that permit consideration of costs and
benefits beyond human and environmental health impacts).
194 For example, in the OTAG negotiations participation by Midwestern and
Southern states ensured that their concerns about economic growth factors were
addressed. See supra note 112-115 and accompanying text. Under the CAA, economic
and growth factors are not among the items the EPA may consider in setting permissible
NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A). Participation by the Midwestern and Southern
states in OTAG's consensual, nonregulatory process ensured that economic and growth
factors might enter into the decisionmaking process prior to the EPA's establishment of
regulations. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text; see also Parts II.D, III.A.
195 Because environmental disputes may involve as many as 15 to 20 parties, the
"dynamics of the negotiations" may be fundamentally altered. MCCARTHY & SHORETr,
supra note 188, at 2. A mediator can help to keep negotiating blocks coherent, manage
time effectively, and cohesively organize all the parties in such a large process. See id.
This may be particularly relevant in situations, like the OTAG process, where the
number of participants number as high as 37 states.
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recommend. In addition, the EPA's interests in the dispute, identified
above, 196 may have compromised its impartiality.
A mediator should be impartial in the dispute and technically qualified
to understand and converse on the environmental problems in issue. 197
Impartiality ensures that disputants will trust and confide in the mediator. 198
Because the mediator faces the daunting task of assisting the parties in
recognizing common interests and realizing mutually acceptable
solutions, 199 disputants must trust and confide in the mediator or the
mediator risks failure in accurate assessment of these interests and
solutions. 200 Furthermore, technical qualification on the environmental
issues in dispute ensures that the parties can accurately communicate with
the mediator.201 Without this technical qualification, the mediator risks
196 See discussion supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
197 See MCCARTHY & SHOREIT, supra note 188, at 31 (noting that the parties may
reject a mediator if they perceive bias or ineffective qualifications); 1 NANCY H.
ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 11:01 (2d ed.
1994) (noting that the standards for mediator qualification "typically require mediators
to maintain confidentiality (to the extent permitted by law) [and] neutrality"); 1 id.
§ 12:07 (noting that some commentators believe "the environmental mediator ought to
be qualified in the relevant scientific areas as well as in mediation skills"). But see 1 id.
§ 11:02 (discussing the "cautious approach" advocated by the Society for Professionals
in Dispute Resolution, which warns against requiring mediators to possess advanced
degrees and specialized skills because "these have no demonstrated effectiveness").
198 See Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to
Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85, 96 (1981) (noting that "[i]f the mediator is
neutral... then he and his office invite a bond of trust to develop between him and the
parties" and that the mediator's "commitment to neutrality ensures confidentiality").
199 See 1 ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 197, § 3:02 (noting that "a mediator
assists parties in... clarifying interests, in identifying alternative resolutions, and in
accepting compromise").
200 See Stulberg, supra note 198, at 96-97 (discussing how a mediator who fails to
acquire the trusts and confidences of the parties "could jeopardize or abridge the
substantive interests of the respective parties" and providing examples of how such a
failure to acquire the parties' trusts and confidences could cause the mediator to
inaccurately assess the interests and solutions essential to effective settlement).
201 See id. at 96 (noting that, in the environmental context, "[t]he content
knowledge a mediator should have depends on the specific type of dispute.., and what
the parties believe will be the most useful to them" because "[t]he parties at least want
the mediator to be intelligent enough to become educated about the matters in dispute as
the talks progress"). A mediator must ask himself if the issues are too technical or
might require an expert at various stages in the mediation. See id. at 34. Furthermore,
the mediator should outline his approach to mediating the kind of dispute at hand. This
gives the parties full opportunity to assess the value this mediator might add as well as
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misunderstandings and miscommunications with the parties which could
frustrate consensus on proposed solutions. 202
In the OTAG negotiations, if the EPA had assumed the role of a
mediator, it might have approached the negotiations with too much bias.
Because it was the EPA's mandate that brought the states into the OTAG
process, it is reasonable that some of the states might have viewed the EPA
as biased toward a position that interstate ozone transport occurs and must
be controlled. 20 3 Thus, the EPA would fail to satisfy one of the important
qualifications of a mediator-that the mediator be impartial in the
dispute.204
However, if the EPA had designated another party as mediator, the
OTAG process might not have resulted in the filing of section 126
petitions. A mediator in the OTAG process might have offered two
advantages over negotiation. First, the mediator might have built provisions
for enforcement into the final recommendations. If the mediator had been
sanctioned with authority to bind the parties or was a legally recognized
authority, then the ability to commit the parties to final recommendations
would have been enhanced. 205 This would be true for both the Northeastern
states (by ensuring that the section 126 petition process was foreclosed
before initiating the OTAG process) and the Midwest and South (by
committing the EPA to adoption of the OTAG recommendations without
change).
identify methods they know will lead to tension or stalemate later in the process. See
CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 187, at 195-196.
202 See Stulberg, supra note 198, at 96. Stulberg notes that:
The knowledgeable mediator can ask penetrating questions, be sensitive to when
parties are erecting artificial constraints on their conduct, and avoid becoming an
obstacle in the discussions of the more subtle nuances of the matters in dispute.
The mediator does not possess such knowledge, however, for the purpose of
serving as an expert who advises the parties as to the "right answers."
Id.
203 In fact, it was the EPA that threatened to use its authority under the 1990
CAAA to compel the parties into participation in OTAG. It would not have been
unreasonable for the parties to perceive this behavior as a commitment on the EPA's
part to the position that interstate ozone transport was a scientifically valid problem that
must be regulated. See Wilcox, supra note 9, at 71-72.
204 See MCCARTHY & SHORETT, supra note 188, at 31.
205 See id. at 62-64.
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The second advantage a mediator might have offered to the OTAG
process would be the advantage of a third party perspective. 20 6 The
mediator is not tied to a loyal constituency. 207 The mediator can view the
parties' positions from an unjaundiced eye, readily recognizing a party's
weakest and strongest arguments. In this way, the mediator can advocate
tradeoffs and bargaining that might not otherwise result.208 In the OTAG
context, the mediator might have helped states recognize the least costly
and most effective regulatory processes. In fact, the mediator could have
helped the parties use the OTAG forum as an opportunity to adopt novel
regulatory schemes such as have been adopted in other environmental
contexts. 209 However, as outlined above, 210 the success of a mediator in an
interstate pollution context is largely dependent on finding a mediator that
is unbiased, trusted by the parties, knowledgeable in technical
environmental matters, and granted recognizable authority to legally bind
the parties to a settlement. 21'
3. The Role of an Arbitrator
The interstate pollution arena is already served by an arbitrator. That
arbitrator is the EPA. Just as the EPA will serve as final arbitrator of the
section 126 petitions, 212 so too does the EPA settle disputes between states
regarding interstate pollution under other federal environmental statutes. 213
206 See id. at 40-42; 1 ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 197, § 1:01 ("Mediators
are 'third parties .... ').
207 See MCCARTHY & SHORETT, supra note 188, at 31 (noting that the parties
should reject a mediator if they perceive bias or ineffective qualification).
208 See id. at 46-47.
209 See id. at 50-51.
210 See discussion supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
211 See MCCARTHY & SHoRETr, supra note 188, at 31, 62-64.
212 The EPA will serve as the final arbitrator in a section 126 petition, as the EPA
makes the determination that "any major source or group of stationary sources emits or
would emit any air pollutant in violation of" SIP provisions addressing interstate
pollution abatement. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (1994). However, the EPA's determination is
subject to judicial review by the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate
circuit. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994).
213 Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994), the
Supreme Court has held that the EPA should be given deference as the final
decisionmaker in a dispute between two states regarding pollutants flowing from an
upstream state with less stringent water quality standards into a downstream state with
more stringent water quality standards. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 111-
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For this reason, exploration of the role an arbitrator might have played in
the OTAG process is not fully relevant to this Note. If the EPA had chosen
to assert its authority as an arbitrator, then the interstate ozone transport
dispute would have been resolved in a manner similar to the resolution of
other environmental disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
The OTAG negotiations represent the EPA's first attempt at negotiated
rulemaking regarding a widespread and persistent interstate pollutant. The
process involved more than thirty-seven parties; required two years of
research, negotiation, and recommendation; and culminated in the filing of
section 126 petitions. The filing of these petitions indicate that the parties
did not reach a degree of consensus which Northeast states found
compelling. Instead, these states perceived that their interests would best be
served by circumventing a consensual negotiated agreement and pursuing a
more immediate remedy. This Note has identified the role of the parties'
interests in driving this decision, presented alternative dispute resolution
techniques that might have been more effective in the OTAG process, and
pointed to weaknesses in the process that was used.
112 (1992). The EPA opted, in the Arkansas case, to enforce the more stringent water
quality standard, and the Supreme Court held that under the CWA the EPA's choice as
to which state's water quality standards to apply should be given deference. See id.

